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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
appeal by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the doctrine of res judicata barred the trial
court from clarifying the nature of Mr. Busch's Utah state
law obligation to pay the parties' second mortgage in light
of the Bankruptcy Court's prior ruling with respect to the
nature of that obligation for purposes of federal bankruptcy
law.

A trial court's determination of whether res judicata

bars consideration of an issue presents a question of law
reviewable for correctness.
Neways,

See Maoris

2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214.

<£ Associates

v.

This issue was preserved

in Mr. Busch's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation.
(R. 525-526)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC.
There are no determinative constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose
interpretation is determinative or of central importance to
this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from final orders of the Third

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County denying Mr.
Busch's Motion for Order Clarifying Nature of Obligation and
overruling Mr. Busch's Objection to Commissioner's
Recommendation.
II.

Statement of Facts
1.

The trial of this action was held in December of

1999. (R. 133)
2.

At trial, petitioner requested, inter alia, that

respondent be ordered to pay the parties' second mortgage
obligation as additional alimony. (R. 722 at p. 59, lines 57)
3.

The Decree of Divorce was entered January 14, 2000.

Therein, respondent was ordered:
a. "to pay child support in the sum of $524.66 per
month pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support
Guidelines."
b. "to pay the Petitioner $1,100 per month alimony for
a term equal to the length of the marriage, which is
thirteen (13) years and eleven (11) months from the
date of entry of this Decree."
c. "Respondent will assume and pay and hold Petitioner
harmless from ... the second mortgage on the parties'
home."

(R. 141-145, paragraphs 4, 10 & 11)
4.
made at

There was no evidence presented nor any argument

trial, nor was there any finding of fact made by the trial
court,
from which it would have been appropriate to order Mr. Busch
to
pay the second mortgage as his share of the marital debt.
5.

Petitioner Cindy Busch (hereinafter referred to by

her new married name "Hancock") remarried in or around
September 2000. (R. 466)

Accordingly, respondent's alimony

obligation terminated at that time in accordance with Utah
Code Ann. section 30-3-5(8).
6.

Respondent filed a Voluntary Petition for relief

under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah on July 28, 2000.
Ms. Hancock filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court
in which, among other things, she claimed priority status
for Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the parties' second
mortgage. (R. 721 at page 13)
7.

Mr. Busch objected to Ms. Hancock's proof of claim.

Following hearings held March 13, 2001 and June 7, 2001,
however, the bankruptcy court issued an oral ruling that,
for purposes of federal bankruptcy law, Mr. Busch's

obligation to pay the parties' second mortgage is entitled
to priority treatment as a debt in the nature of child
support, but only until August 26, 2004, the parties' minor
child's eighteenth birthday. (R. 721, Tab 1 at page 4, lines
7-9)
8.

The parties' second mortgage is amortized over 30

years with a balloon payment due January 1, 2013. (R. 721,
Tab 1 at page 2, lines 1-2)
9.

On or about March 22, 2001, Mr. Busch filed a

Motion for Order Clarifying Nature of Obligation in the case
at bar in which he requested, inter alia, that the trial
court clarify that for purposes of Utah state law his
obligation to pay the second mortgage was in the nature of
alimony which terminated upon Ms. Hancock's remarriage. (R.
465-467)
10.

A hearing on Mr. Busch's motion was held before

the Honorable Michael S. Evans on April 24, 2001.

At the

conclusion of the hearing, Commissioner Evans recommended
that Mr. Busch's motion be denied because x'[i]n view of [the
bankruptcy court's] ruling it is the opinion of this Court
that the issue now sought to be brought before this Court in
Defendant's [sic] Motion is, in fact, Res Judicata because

of Judge Clark's [i.e., the bankruptcy judge's] ruling on
the same issue." (R. 567-568)
11.

Mr. Busch filed his Objection to Commissioner's

Recommendation on May 2, 2001. (R. 525-526)
12.

Following a hearing before the Honorable Bruce

Lubeck on August 14, 2001, the trial court issued its Order
on Defendant's [sic] Objection to Commissioner's
Recommendation in which it overruled Mr. Busch's objection
to Commissioner Evans' recommendation. (R. 690-691)
13.

Mr. Busch timely filed his Notice of Appeal on

September 26, 2001. (R. 692)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In order for the issue preclusion branch of res
judicata to have barred consideration of Mr. Busch's Motion
for Order Clarifying Nature of Obligation the trial court
was first required to "determine whether the issues actually
litigated in the [bankruptcy court were] precisely
as those raised in the present action."
& Through

Utah Dept.,

1983)(quoting Wilde

Schaer

the
v.

State

same
By

657 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah
v.

Mid-Century

Insurance

417, 419 (Utah 1981))(emphasis original).

Co.,

635 P.2d

Mr. Busch

respectfully submits that the issue decided by the

bankruptcy court was substantially different from the one
which he asked the trial court to decide in the case at bar.
The issue before the bankruptcy court was whether Mr.
Busch's obligation to pay the parties' second mortgage was
entitled to priority treatment as a debt in the nature of
child support within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(7)
and 1322(a) (2) .

For purposes of sections 507(a) (7) and

1322(a)(2), the determination of whether an obligation
arising under a Decree of Divorce is in the nature child
support is a question of federal bankruptcy law regardless
of the nature of that obligation under state law.
re Sampson,

E.g.,

In

997 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 1993).

The issue which Mr. Busch asked the trial court to
decide in the case at bar, on the other hand, is whether his
obligation to pay the second mortgage was intended to be in
lieu of additional alimony which terminated upon Ms.
Hancock's remarriage in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
section 30-3-5 (8) .
Because the two issues are not "precisely the same,"
the issue preclusion branch of res judicata is not
applicable.

Schaer,

657 P.2d at 1341.

ARGUMENT
The issue decided by the bankruptcy court is not the
same issue which Mr. Busch asked the trial court to
decide in the case at bar.
There are two branches to the doctrine of res judicata:
claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
Associates,

Inc.

v.

Neways,

Inc.,

E.

g.,

Macris

&

2000 UT 93, 119, 16 P.3d

1214, 1219.
The basic difference between the two branches of res
judicata is simply put: while "claim preclusion applies
. . . issue preclusion, or collateral
to whole claims''
estoppel, arises from a different cause of action and
prevents parties ... from relitigating "particular
issues
that have been contested and resolved/'
Id.

at 134 (quoting 18 James Wm. Moore, Moore's

Practice

Federal

§ 131.13[1](Matthew Bender, 3d ed. 2000))(Supreme

Court's emphasis).

Mr. Busch believes it is clear that the

case at bar involves the issue preclusion branch of res
judicata and will limit his arguments accordingly.
In order for issue preclusion to have barred
consideration of Mr. Busch's Motion for Order Clarifying
Nature of Obligation the trial court was first required to
determine "whether the issues actually litigated in the
[bankruptcy court were] precisely

the

same as those raised

in the instant action."1
Care,

Swainston

v.

Intermountain

766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988)(quoting Wilde

Century

Insurance

Co.,

Utah Dept.,

v.

Mid-

635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah

1981)) (emphasis original); see
Through

Health

also

Schaer

v.

State

By &

657 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah 1983).

Mr. Busch respectfully submits that issue preclusion is
not applicable in this case because the issue decided by the
bankruptcy court was substantially different from the one
which he asked the trial court to decide.

The issue which

Mr. Busch asked the trial court to decide is whether his
obligation to pay the parties' second mortgage was intended
to be in lieu of additional alimony which terminated upon
Ms. Hancock's remarriage in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
section 30-3-5(8).
law.

That is, of course, a question of state

The issue before the bankruptcy court, on the other

x

The Supreme Court of Utah has established "a four-part
test to determine whether the doctrine of issue preclusion
is applicable: First, the issue challenged must be identical
in the previous action and in the case at hand. Second, the
issue must have been decided in a final judgment on the
merits in the previous action. Third, the issue must have
been competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the
previous action. Fourth, the party against whom collateral
estoppel is invoked in the current action must have been
either a party or privy to a party in the previous action."
Maoris,
2000 UT 93, 137, 16 P.3d at 1222. Only the first
part of this test will be addressed by Mr. Busch.

hand, was whether Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the second
mortgage was entitled to priority treatment as a debt in the
nature of child support within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §§
507(a)(7) and 1322(a)(2).

The determination of whether an

obligation arising under a Decree of Divorce is in the
nature of child support is a question of federal bankruptcy
law regardless of the nature of that obligation under state
In re

law.
Matter

of

Shaver,
2

Sampson,

Biggs,

997 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 1993);

907 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1990); and Shaver

v.

736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984). 2

In Sampson,
recognized that

the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

Congress, by directing federal courts to determine
whether an obligation is "actually in the nature of
alimony, maintenance, or support," sought to ensure
that section 523(a) (5)'s underlying policy is not
undermined either by the treatment of the obligation
under state law or by the label which the parties
attach to the obligation. Thus, a debtor's lack of
duty under state law to support his or her former
spouse does not control whether an obligation to the
former spouse is dischargeable in bankruptcy.
997 F.2d at 722 (emphasis added); see also Sylvester v.
Sylvester,
865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989)("While it is
true that the divorce decree refers to the settlement
agreement as a ^property settlement,' that label does not
resolve the issue. The determination of whether an
obligation arising out of a divorce settlement is in the
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support is a matter of
federal bankruptcy law"); In re Goin, 808 F.2d 1391 (10th
Cir. 1987)("bankruptcy courts are not bound by state laws

At the April 24, 2001 hearing on Mr. Busch's Motion for
Order Clarifying Nature of Obligation Ms, Hancock
acknowledged that the issue decided by the bankruptcy court
is different from the one which Mr. Busch asked the trial
court to decide:
THE COURT: ... how would you characterize [the nature
of Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the second mortgage]
then?
Mr. TYCKSEN: Your Honor, I believe if I were to try to
characterize it from what this court would normally do,
I couldn't do it because the, to call it child support
[as the bankruptcy court did] would not be truthful.
It isn't child support. To call it alimony would not
be truthful either as this court would normally do.
But in the application of Federal Law and Bankruptcy
Law in that court as it's been applied over there,
there are cases that say that if it has the effect of
providing support to the family, i.e., maintaining a
household with a dependent child and those kinds of
things which is what the court found over there, then
it is, in fact, [in the nature of child support and]
not dischargable.
(R. 721 at page 5, line 21 thru page 6, line 8)

that define an item as maintenance or property settlement,
nor are they bound to accept a divorce decree's
characterization of an award as maintenance or a property
settlement"); In re Yeates,
807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir.
1986) (same); and In re Dewey, 223 B.R. 559 (10th Cir. BAP
1998)(same).

case3 is also instructive-

The Swainston

At issue in

that case was IHC's successive motions to disqualify the
firm of Howard, Lewis & Peterson from representing
plaintiffs in two cases against IHC.
bar, Swainston
IHC,

Similar to the case at

involved a federal court action, Bodily

and two Utah state court actions, Wilson

Swainston

itself.

v.

v.

IHC and

Unlike the case at bar, the Swainstons

were not parties to either Bodily

or Wilson.

firm represented the plaintiff in Bodily,
represented IHC in Wilson.

The Howard

but had

IHC contended that this

simultaneous representation of adverse parties constituted a
violation of Canon 5 of the Utah Code of Professional
Responsibility.

In Bodily,

the federal court denied IHC's

motion to disqualify on the merits.

In Swainston,

the

Fourth District Court denied IHC's subsequent motion to
disqualify ruling that "IHC was collaterally estopped from
litigating its motion because a similar motion had
previously been litigated in a case in federal court.''
P.2d at 1059.

766

IHC appealed from the Fourth District's

ruling arguing that "the state court was not bound by the

3

Swainston

v.

Intermountain

1059, 1061 (Utah 1988).

Health

Care,

766 P.2d

federal court's ruling on the disqualification motion
because the federal court decision relied on federal, not
state, law."

766 P.2d at 1060.

The Supreme Court agreed

and reversed, explaining as follows:
We must determine ^whether the issues actually
litigated in the first action are precisely the same as
those raised in the instant action." [citations
omitted] In Bodily,
the relevant question was whether
the outcome of the case would be affected by the Howard
firm's involvement in Wilson.
In the present action,
the relevant question is whether the present
action
has
been affected or prejudiced by the Howard Firm's
involvement in Wilson.
The questions are not
necessarily identical. There may be facts in Wilson
which were not relevant to Bodily
but are important to
the present action. The Bodily
court's ruling on the
disqualification motion decided that the relevant facts
from Wilson did not affect the Bodily
litigation
significantly. However, the scope of the
Bodily
court's inquiry was not large enough to determine that
the Howard firm's involvement in Wilson would not
adversely impact other cases. The first part of our
test for issue preclusion is thus not satisfied.
Swainston,
West

766 P.2d at 1061 (emphasis original); see

Bend Mut.

Ins.

Co.

v.

Berger,

also

531 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Wis.

App. 1995)(collateral estoppel only applies where
controlling facts and legal rules remain unchanged).
Thus, in addition to differences between state and
federal law, the Swainston

Court recognized that differences

in the relevant facts to be considered in the respective
cases is an important consideration in determining whether

issue preclusion is applicable.

In the case at bar, it is

very clear that there were facts which were not only
relevant but determinative in the bankruptcy court but which
would be unimportant to the trial court and visa versa.

As

Ms. Hancock acknowledges, the determinative fact in the
bankruptcy court was that Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the
second mortgage "has the effect of providing support to [Ms.
Hancock's] family."

(R. 721 at page 6, line 5)

Clearly,

that fact would have little, if any, relevance to the issue
which Mr. Busch asked the trial court to address in the case
at bar.

All of Mr. Busch's monetary obligations under the

Decree of Divorce have the effect of providing support to
Mr. Hancock's family.

That fact, however, will not be

helpful in determining whether Mr. Busch's obligation to pay
the second mortgage was intended by the trial court to be in
lieu of additional alimony or was simply intended to be part
of the parties' property settlement.

Further, under Utah

law child support is determined by the guidelines set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14.

Section 78-45-7.14 was not

relevant in the bankruptcy court.
That a different issue was decided by the bankruptcy
court is also demonstrated by answering the question: why

did res judicata not bar the bankruptcy court from
considering the issues decided in the Decree of Divorce?
The Decree of Divorce was entered long before the bankruptcy
court's involvement.

The answer, of course, is that the

Decree of Divorce did not determine the nature of Mr.
Busch's obligation to pay the second mortgage for purposes
of federal bankruptcy law.

It is just as clear that the

bankruptcy court was not concerned with the determining the
nature of that obligation for state law purposes.
In short, the question which Mr. Busch asked the trial
court to decide in the case at bar is not whether his
obligation to pay the second mortgage was entitled to
priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. section 1322(a)(2) or
dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(5).

Rather,

the question which Mr. Busch asked the trial court to decide
is whether his obligation to pay the second mortgage was
intended as additional alimony which terminated upon Ms.
Hancock's remarriage.

Because the two issues are not

"precisely the same," the issue preclusion branch of res
judicata is not applicable.

Schaer,

657 P.2d at 1341.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Busch respectfully requests
that the trial court's Orders denying his Motion for Order
Clarifying Nature of Obligation and his Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation be reversed and that this case
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this Court's decision.
DATED this

y of January, 2002.

•Attorney for Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Undersigned certifies that two copies of the foregoing
were mailed this /Y^^day
of January 2002 via first class
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Steven C. Tycksen
360 West 5300 South, Suite 360
Murray, Utah 84123

Addendum 1

FILED
Btt^l,
TWrd Judicial^
r

'j

Steven C. Tycksen (3300)
Zoll & Tycksen, L.C.
2 Attorneys for Petitioner
360 West 5300 South, #360
3
Murray, Utah 84123
4 Telephone: (801) 685-7800
Facsimile: (801) 685-7808
5
1

6

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

7

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

8
9
10

ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CLARIFY
DECREE & PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
DEFER HER OBLIGATION TO PAY
DEFENDANT'S EQUITY UNTIL HE HAS
SATISFIED THE SECOND MORTGAGE

CINDY A. BUSCH,
Plaintiff,

11
12
vs.
13
14

JAY BUSCH,

Civil No. 984908136
Judge Stirba
Commissioner Evans

15
16

Defendant.

17
18

The Defendant's Motion to Clarity Decree and Plaintiffs Motion to Defer her Obligation to

19 Pay Defendant's Equity until he has satisfied the Second Mortgage came on for Hearing on Tuesday,
20 April 24, 2001 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Michael S. Evans, Domestic
21

Commissioner. The Plaintiff was present in Court and represented by her attorney, Steven C.

22 Tycksen. The Defendant was present in Court and represented by'his attorney, Scott Mitchell.
23

The parties made legal argument to the Court through counsel, whereupon the Commissioner

24
25

1

1 made a recommendation for an Order.. The Court having reviewed the recommendation, the file and
2

legal memoranda, and for good cause therein appearing, does now hereby:

3

ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows:

4

1.

5

Defendant's bankruptcy case and found that the Defendant's obligation to pay the second mortgage

6

was a debt that was in the nature of support and was therefore non-dischargeable.

7

2.

8

before this Court in Defendant's Motion is, in fact, Res Judicata because of Judge Clark's ruling on

9

the same issue.

10

3.

The Court Finds that the Bankruptcy Court exercised its concurrent jurisdiction in the

In view of that ruling it is the opinion of this Court that the issue now sought to be brought

The Court therefore declines to rule further on the matter.

11 4.

The Defendant's Motion to Clarify the Decree is therefore denied.

12

The Court finds that the Defendant's obligation to pay the second mortgage is a reasonable

5.

13 pre-condition to his right to receive his equity in the marital home and orders therefore that the
14

Plaintiffs obligation to pay Defendant his equity in the marital home shall be deferred until he has

15

satisfied the second mortgage in full.

16

DATED this

ay of April, 20(10.

17
18
19
20
21

RECOMMENDED:

22
23
24
25

vans, Domestic Commissioner \

orney for the Defendant

Addendum 2

FIUD
Third

1
2
3
4
5

T COUliT

District

Steven C. Tycksen (3300)
Zoll & Tycksen, L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
360 West 5300 South, Suite 360
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 685-7800
Facsimile: (801) 685-7808
I N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT I N AND FOR

6
7

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

8
9
10
11
12

ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION
TO COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATION

CINDY A. BUSCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

13

14
15

JAY BUSCH,

Civil No. 984908136
Judge Bruce Lubeck
Commissioner Evans

Defendant.

16
17

The Defendant's Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation made

18

by Commissioner Michael Evans during a Hearing held in this matter on April

19

24, 2001 came on regularly for oral argument before the Honorable Bruce

20

Lubeck, District Court Judge on August 14, 2001. The Plaintiff was represented

21

by Steven C. Tycksen, but did not appear personally.

22

present in Court and was represented by Scott Mitchell, Esq. The Court heard

23

argument of counsel and having reviewed the memoranda and moving papers

24
25
26

1

The Defendant was

1 and being otherwise fully advised in the premises does now hereby
2

ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows:

3

1.

4
5
6
7

The

Defendant's

Objection

to

the

Commissioner's

Recommendation is overruled.
2.

The Commissioner's Recommendation is sustained and
upheld by the Court.

DATED this

of August, 2 0 0 1 .

